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1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the basic requirements for the design and algorithms of operation of 
a multi-parametric, synergistic sensory network – Smart Synergistic Security Sensory 
Network or Net4S – specially adapted for operation at nuclear power plants or other 
potentially dangerous sites. This network contains sensors of different types and is capable 
of analyzing the dynamics of environmental processes and predicting the most probable 
events. The discussion includes analysis of: 1) the technical aspects of operability of the 
sensors, optical and electrical telecommunication channels, and computers in the presence 
of ionizing radiation; 2) the influence of environmental parameters on the sensors’ accuracy 
and network operability; and 3) the development of simulators capable of advising safe 
solutions based on the analysis of the data acquired by the Net4S. Such a real-time operating 
network should monitor: (1) environmental and atmospheric conditions – chemical, 
biological, radiological, explosive, and weather hazards; (2) climate/man-induced 
catastrophes; (3) contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public health care delivery; 
and (4) large public/industrial/government/military areas. Military personnel, police 
officers, firefighters, miners, rescue teams, and nuclear power plant personnel may use the 
mobile terminals (man-operated vehicles or unmanned robots) as separate multi-sensor 
units for local and remote monitoring.  
Among different types of sensors, only optical laser sensors can respond immediately and 
remotely. Such sensors can simultaneously monitor several gases, vapours, and ions with 
the help of single tunable laser; however, the use of several lasers operating at different, well 
separated wavelengths, dramatically improves accuracy and reliability, and increases the 
number of monitored substances. The Net4S, monitoring a number of parameters inside and 
outside a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), can serve as the security, safety, and controlling 
system of the NPP. 
Besides the technical issues, the chapter also discusses the social aspects of the Nuclear 
Power Plants’ design, construction, and exploitation. Some power consumption-free 
technologies that significantly improve the reliability of the Nuclear Power Plant are 
discussed.   
In principle, open access publishing is a purely commercial project. After submitting a paper 
to classical journals, the author should wait for a relatively long time and should fight with 
the reviewers – the “narrow specialists” are the author’s competitors and usually state that 
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everything is known, that the subject of publication is not interesting, and that the author is 
of low qualification. The “wide specialists” do not understand what the paper is about and 
criticize in general – the current tendency in science and technology are out of the subject 
that the author discusses, that any laser now can be bought off the shelf, and so on. Because 
of this paradox, a lot of the papers that were later nominated for prestigious awards were 
initially rejected. In some sense, open access publishing is free from these disadvantages. 
However, since the publisher should generate maximum profits from this activity, the high 
requirements for the quality of publications are difficult to be completed.   
The next argument is then why so critically select the papers if, anyway, no one can or 
wants to estimate the real value of new papers. At the same time, open access publications 
have one very serious advantage. Government experts mostly write in reports what their 
chiefs expect to hear from them, post-graduate students write to please their supervisors, 
and Professors write proposals on subjects that the funding agencies declare in calls, and so 
on. These are because, directly or indirectly, all these categories are payable from the “top 
publishers”. So, once a funding agency declares a solicitation for the investigation of ozone 
hole, a lot of researchers demonstrate how dangerous the hole is. As soon as the funding 
ends, nobody remembers what the ozone hole is.   
A somewhat different situation is present with open access publishing: the author pays for 
the publication, so he/she is almost free not to lie. However, other public requirements, 
such as generating more publications before a thesis defense, getting a Professorship 
position, or being awarded by a Government or private agency push people to publish 
something. Thus, they invest money in future benefits. No one is absolutely honest and 
those who believe that they are, very often have limited knowledge of the subject they 
discuss and analyze. The ways to develop a really safe and effective Nuclear Power plant  
are very twisted and long. The NPP is very big, complex, expensive to be built and proven 
in different variants. Drosophila flight is much more perfect in design and implementation 
since the generation time is several tens of hours, not tens of years as it is for NPPs. Until 
now, the problem of design and safe exploitation of a NPP is very challenging and 
uncertain.        
The author of this chapter is a specialist in laser physics and optical sensors, not in atomic 
physics or its applications. However, Dr. I. Peshko was working in Kyiv, Ukraine at the 
moment of Chernobyl’s “peaceful explosion” and watched the reaction and behavior of 
regular people, academics, government organizations, and researchers. These observations 
can be very useful for analytical specialists who develop general principles of design, 
exploitation, and control of the NPPs. In such a “twilling zone” as the NPP, the probabilistic 
estimation of a single independent person may sometimes be more valuable than official 
reports and opinions of specialists. The bottom line is that official reports are typically 
prepared by specialists and officials to protect themselves and to hide their past mistakes, 
not to protect the future of millions of people. Every time I think about Chernobyl’s events, I 
remember my mother who spent all her life as a housekeeper in a small town in Northern 
Ukraine and understood nothing about atomic energy. One day, when a radio broadcast 
informed us about the government’s decision to build Chernobyl’s Nuclear Power Plant, my 
mother said, “My feelings are very bad. How is it possible to construct a nuclear station in a 
place that is a source of water for tens of millions of people?” As I laughed, I replied, “The 
Chief of the Atomic energy program promised to install his bed on the top of the reactor to 
demonstrate how safe a reactor is.” Unfortunately, time has shown how wrong the best 
specialist was and how right a regular housekeeper was.                   
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2. Synergistic sensory network 
2.1 Threat classification  
Nuclear Power Plants are strategically important objects that may be affected by internal 
and external threats. Consequently, a NPP is considered a potential source of danger to its 
surroundings and, in turn, environmental elements – natural, artificial, and human factors – 
are potential dangers for a NPP. 
Five types of possible threats potentially affecting the NPP are: 
1. Natural catastrophes; 
2. Technological (internal and external) problems resulting in emergencies; 
3. Terrorist threats; 
4. Personnel and security staff sabotage; 
5. Scientific uncertainty and scams. 
The first and second threats in the list above were widely discussed and documented during 
the initial stages of the development of nuclear technologies. The third threat became 
extremely evident after the 9/11 attacks and until now, is a very popular topic of discussion 
at different public and government levels. The fourth threat may be linked with both 
internal and external country sources and may have criminal and political backgrounds. 
Finally, the fifth threat, to our knowledge, is discussed for the first time in this book. It is not 
an issue for detailed discussion here but this is a very serious problem of modern and future 
life. The falsification of scientific results; demonstrations of non-existing products or 
unachieved parameters on the Internet; publication of preliminary, “fast” materials in 
numerous journals; and awarding grants on the basis of relationships rather than merit 
result in unpredictable events with critical technologies. 
I would like to present one example from my personal experiences. A very famous 
Canadian Professor, whom I was working with, proposed a thin diffractive grating filled 
with a biological material as a biosensor. The more specific substance the grating 
accumulates, the stronger the diffraction is. This works in some range of small changes in 
grating strength. However, the Bessel function that describes the diffraction process of the 
thin grating has multiple zero points (solutions); in other words, for several different amounts 
of measured substance, the output signal will be the same. I gently mentioned that this kind 
of technology cannot be used for sensor applications and two weeks later, was fired for 
some formal reasons. If a tenured Professor of a famous University does not know the 
properties of the Bessel functions, this is very bad. However, if the Professor knows this and 
hides it just to receive a grant for the “development” of critical technology, this is much 
worse.           
In attempts to forecast the future, the principle question is: if we know that we don’t know, 
how do we develop a probabilistic solution of the problem with minimal material losses? 
How can we estimate and forecast of “unpredictable” events? First of all, we need to collect 
maximal real-time flows of information. To control the situation inside and outside of a 
NPP, the Sensory Network should monitor several zones: a) core (reactor) area; b) plant 
building and surrounding territory; c) 30-km radius zone (the Chernobyl tragedy showed 
that the strongest radioactive poisoning happened within a 30-km zone); d) in North 
America: Mexico - USA - Canada region (depending on the specific plant location). Thus, a 
NPP is a duplex element of the global security network. It needs to accept information from 
near and far environmental areas, and information regarding what is going on inside the 
NPP should be retrievable from any control station in the country.                 
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The safety zone classification depends on the reactor construction, type of emergency, 
population density, and the locations of other industrial plants. In the case of the recent 
Fucushima reactors catastrophe in Japan, the officials specified 5-km and 20-km evacuation 
zones.  
2.2 Principles of 4SNet 
The development of a Global Monitoring Security Network is the main task on route to 
several scientific, technological, business, military, and political directions of modern life. 
Such a real-time operating network should monitor: (1) environmental and atmospheric 
conditions: chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, and weather hazards; (2) 
climate/man-induced catastrophes; (3) contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public 
health care delivery; (4) large public/industrial/government/military areas. Such a system 
is expected to consist of mobile robotic and stationary platforms, equipped with a set of 
portable environmental sensors that are connected to the monitoring centers. Each sensor 
should be a self-registering, self-reporting, plug-and-play unit that uses unified electrical 
and/or optical connectors and operates with the IP communication protocol. Military 
personnel, police officers, firefighters, miners, rescue teams, and nuclear power plant 
personnel may use the mobile terminals (man-operated vehicles or unmanned robots) as 
separate multi-sensor units for local and remote monitoring. Some of the objects being 
monitored require special attention, such as nuclear and chemical plants, offshore oil 
platforms, mines, military ammunition production facilities, and so on. The Net4S 
components must operate at varying pressures and temperatures; at indoor and outdoor 
conditions; be immune to mechanical, thermal, electro-magnetic and radiological noise; and 
be able to operate in case of electrical blackouts.  
In different areas of the reactor and surrounding territories, different types of sensors can be 
installed. This makes it possible to map temperature, ionizing radiation of different types, 
gas molecules and ion concentrations, vapors, and presence of dust particles. The 
overlapping of all these maps and reconstruction of their dynamics can predict what will 
happen in the close future. During several initial cycles of reactor operation in a “manual 
regime”, the dynamics of all parameters should be recorded and analyzed. During the next 
routine operation, the total network should permanently measure the data, map them, and 
compare with previously averaged data. If even small changes of parameters are 
accumulated along time, this is a sign for alarm. It does not matter which parameter is out of 
the norm. A negligible event may initiate a catastrophe: a cup of coffee left by a personnel 
on the operational panel may flip over and cause damage to the electronics located under 
the desk. Of course, everyone can tell me that nobody is permitted to drink coffee on the 
command desk, and I absolutely agree, but I definitely know that real life is much richer 
with possibilities than any designer or programmer can imagine.  
During the design stage, any chains of possible undesirable events should be simulated and 
analyzed. Let us continue the hypothetical “flipped coffee” example. Because of the short 
circuit in the desk electronics, several high power circuits in the power commutation station 
are simultaneously activated. This results in a fire and uncontrollable activation of the fuel 
reloading system that, in turn, results in the quick heating and destruction of the reactor. This 
example is naïve, very simplified, and may never be realized in practice due to specific reactor 
construction details and algorithms of operation; however, it helps to understand that to 
design a nuclear reactor, psychologists and specialists in the traditions of different cultures 
should be involved, not just specialists in nuclear physics. Previous background and 
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experience are very important as well. In case of a sudden earthquake, people who experience 
it for the first time will chaotically look around; those who have survived a strong earthquake 
may be in panic, but will run away as fast as possible. In both cases the reactor may be out of 
personnel control. So, it is better if the territory around the plant is supplied with sensors that 
can measure the amplitude of impact, activate the reactor shut down system, and sound 
alarms for the personnel. An even better solution is one where the Global Security Network 
can directly and automatically inform the NPP that a tsunami is approaching.   
2.3 Reliability of an inhomogeneous network 
In order to improve reliability, sensor redundancy (using multiple instances of a sensor) can 
be implemented; however, adequateness (ensuring the measured signal pertains only to 
specific parameters) is still not guaranteed. In real life, it is practically impossible to isolate a 
single process and be certain that the measurement is related to just one variable. A readable 
sensor signal may appear as a result of one “strong” interaction with an object, or several 
indirect interactions that affect the sensor in the same way as the “strong” one. Thus, the 
problem of reliability is apparent in these measurements, especially if we need to measure in 
unexpected, unpredictable, and unfriendly conditions. As a simple example: some house 
fire alarm sensors are typically activated every time someone takes a shower; both water 
and fire are interpreted as the same entity by the sensor. These sensors were tested for fire 
emergency events and definitely work well in corresponding conditions; however, nobody 
thought to test them in high humidity conditions, an absolutely "opposite" range of 
application. The result of this is that after several false alarms people typically turn off a fire 
alarm sensor. Thus, the adequateness of measurements is questioned every time. 
A sensory network, where the sensors operate in different physical domains, should be 
used. This creates an inhomogeneous network with a variety of sensors capable to perform 
joint analyses and mapping of different datasets.  
References (Peshko, 2007; Matharoo, 2010) discuss a concept of an “inhomogeneous 
network”. This network combines a set of different types of sensors to measure different 
parameters (sub-networks), and different types of sensors that measure the same parameter 
but based on different physical phenomena. For example, temperature can be measured by a 
bi-metallic thermometer (mechanical thermo-deformation), by a thermocouple thermometer 
(a junction between two different metals that produces a voltage related to a temperature 
difference), and can be calculated from the gas optical absorption spectra (spectral line 
broadening is proportional to the temperature). Evidently, in this hierarchy, the simplest 
implementation (and one that does not require any power supply) is the bi-metallic 
thermometer. It may not give information very precisely, but it does “survive” in harsh 
conditions. In an inhomogeneous network, the sensors synergistically collect and analyze 
information that individual sensors cannot. This information may be used as a rough 
measurement for evaluation of more sophisticated multi-parametric processes. If one knows 
the local temperature of a gas even with relatively low accuracy, the gas concentration 
remote measurement based on spectroscopy principles may be many times more accurate 
than if the temperature is unknown. 
The sensor network should be analyzed and tested very carefully for the possibility of very 
rare but theoretically possible scenarios: due to strong irradiation, signals may saturate the 
transmittance of the processing system that may be interpreted as no signal or a very weak 
signal.      
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The required ability to interface with different sensors poses a challenge in maintaining a 
high level of overall system reliability. Using duplicate sensors for the same task decreases 
the probability of failure. If different sensors are used, each type of sensor needs to be 
rigorously tested to identify its most appropriate ranges and conditions of operation. Once 
this data is available for all the different types of sensors, an algorithm will be deployed to 
choose the sensor that has the likelihood of providing the most accurate reading at those 
environmental conditions. This provides a base platform for synergistic reliability. The best 
way is if the same set of parameters, such as level of radiation, temperature in some specific 
places, humidity, and presence of some gases or ions, can be measured locally and remotely. 
A difference in data, being acquired by local and remote sensory networks, means that 
"something is wrong".  
A typical situation in science and technology is one when different groups of scientists and 
engineers developing devices working in the same area of research or technology fight with 
each other, proving which technology is better, cheaper, more accurate, and so on. For such 
sites as a NPP, the “single best choice” is unacceptable as nobody can predict for sure which 
technology will survive longer and would be more accurate in some unexpected conditions.  
The data acquired at a NPP should be accessible (monitored) at plant command station but 
the NPP's personnel should not have access and ability to modify these data. They should be 
transferred to the external command and processing center. Even in cases when the data 
seems incorrect or “stupid”, they should be transferred and analyzed together with data 
from surrounding areas. A meteorite can be registered by seismic, gaseous, and temperature 
sensors 5 km away from a NPP and this can be interpreted by the NPP’s security network 
and personnel as a nuclear bomb explosion. In any case, the reactor cannot be stopped 
immediately, so each minute is crucial when preparing for critical events.             
2.4 Synergistic cross-data 
In an inhomogeneous, multi-level security network, each sensor, first of all, is responsible 
for measuring some specific parameters; at the same time, it supplies other sensors with 
some additional information that serves for more accurate measurements, more precise 
description of the investigated multi-parametric phenomena, and for the development of 
some conclusions about the characteristics of monitored events. Typically, the smart 
sensory network uses a set of sensors that control some secondary phenomena but still 
help in evaluation of the main process. For example, the level of ionizing radiation around 
a reactor in a power plant can be monitored with a set of scintillators; however, the 
concentration of the ionized air over the reactor can be measured well remotely and the 
radiation level can be estimated. Of course, this is not a direct measurement and it 
strongly depends on the reactor construction and principles of operation. Though, in case 
of an emergency, such estimations can be done from hundreds or even thousands of 
meters away from danger zones. Being preliminarily calibrated, this technique can 
provide quite accurate measurements.         
To introduce the concept of an “inhomogeneous network of synergistic sensors”, consider a 
simple example. If your home thermometer, barometer, and humidity meter show values of 
28C, 750 torr, and 70% respectively, considering these devices individually, one can 
conclude that the weather is beautiful. Now, a synergistic complex, which is actually a set of 
different sensors – humidity, temperature, pressure, oxygen, methane, carbon 
oxide/dioxide, etc. – tells you that during the last two hours, the pressure fell from 770 to 
750 torr, the humidity increased from 45% to 70%, the temperature increased by 3C, and 
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the concentration of methane in your kitchen increased from 0.0002% to 0.2%. The dynamics 
of pressure, humidity, and temperature readings tell you that a hurricane is approaching, 
while the methane reading tells you that there is a gas leak in the house. Each separate 
reading does not say something terrible, but the history of parameter changes may predict 
that the roof of your house (that you were going to repair), may be destroyed by a hurricane, 
and because of the methane explosion, your house will be on the news.       
A very important feature of the synergistic sensory complex is its ability to predict events; 
thus, the complex can alert you that the current, “beautiful” environmental data is just the 
beginning of a critical event. As another example, all gasoline stations are supposed to be 
equipped with fire alarm sensors; however, no one has considered implementing detectors 
for the presence of explosive materials or checking the quality of the electrical ground of fuel 
tanks and electronic equipment at the station. Potential sources of sparks, burned cigarettes, 
or explosive materials should be monitored before the fire starts and is then detected. Thus, 
the fire alarm sensory network should be “inhomogeneous” – it must contain different types 
of sensors capable of synergistically analyzing different scenarios.  
A combination of several sensors can provide an estimation of an environmental event or 
emergency. For example, in case of a fire, CO, CO2, H2O vapour, and other specific gases 
(CxHy, NOx) are emitted. However, the temperature and relative concentrations of these 
gases are different in the case of burning gasoline, wood, or plastic. A smart, multi-gas, 
multi-functional sensor would be able to tell the difference between a well-done BBQ on the 
stove versus a stove on fire. The difference is in the corresponding gas concentrations and 
character of light. A flame is chaotically modulated whereas a lamp over the stove irradiates 
light with constant intensity.  
By referencing the measured concentrations with a database and analyzing the deviations in 
environmental conditions, the sensory platform can immediately generate the most 
plausible reason for the emergency. Analysis of space-time event maps and weather 
conditions will help to remotely identify the event and predict its dynamics.  
3. Natural inhomogeneous network 
It is often said that nature is the best creator, and that after many years of evolution, we 
are all products of good design. Our bodies are complex systems comprising of sensors, a 
central processing unit, and actuation devices. The human sensory-network is an example 
of a “well-designed” system. Every day, we use our senses of smell, touch, taste, hearing, 
balance, and vision, and although different sensors located throughout the human body 
register these sensations, the information gathered is sent through the same neurons to 
the brain, where it is processed and interpreted. After the data is processed and a decision 
is made, the “CPU center” activates a movable platform – the body. The decision made is 
based on information extracted from sensors specializing in different domains, i.e. 
analysis of electromagnetic fields, mechanical vibrations, chemical reactions, etc. The 
design of new technology is often driven by efforts to mimic designs found in nature. The 
problem is how to develop a “smart” sensory network for a power plant and environment 
monitoring that operates in a similar fashion to its biological counterpart, yet is capable of 
performing tasks not possible by natural sensory-organs, in an effort to increase public 
and private security. 
As an additional example, imagine that you say to your significant other that you love them. 
You then receive feedback signals from different information channels – verbal responses, 
facial expressions, body movement, breathing patterns, etc. Each separate channel may 
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generate a false signal or no signal, e.g. they may close their eyes, but is it because they are 
happy or afraid to say “no”?   
If any sensor/channel of information fails, the total human ability drops down; however, 
because of synergistic inhomogeneity, a human still operates, i.e. visually impaired people. 
Another very interesting capability of the human sensory network is that if one channel 
fails, the other ones increase sensitivity to compensate for the lost data set. This is why 
visually impaired people often have an “absolute musical” hearing and can easily recognize 
similar sources of sound belonging to different objects, i.e. the footsteps of different people. 
How to teach or train the 4SNet for these capabilities is not currently clear.           
4. How and what to do? 
From an initial glance, the market is full of different types of sensors; however, there are still 
some gaping holes. For example, there are many methane sensors on the market, but 
thousands of miners around the world still die each year due to methane asphyxia or 
explosions. Similar arguments can be made for carbon monoxide sensors. NASA still 
announces a competition for the development of O2, CO, and CO2 sensors for extra-
terrestrial missions; military and recreational divers still lack compact, reliable, and long-
lasting sensors for the control of breathing gases; soldiers still die from roadside bombs; and 
airport security systems still do not detect explosives well. Current tendencies in advanced 
technologies pertain to the development of simple, cheap hardware and sophisticated 
software. Each sensor measures something; the deficiency, however, is in the interpretation 
of the data, shifting the problem from the real to the virtual world – complicated software 
might be more unpredictable and unstable than complicated hardware. However, it is much 
cheaper to correct software and to reload processors than to repair or upgrade millions of 
sensors. 
To summarize, we then pose the following question: What are the basic requirements for a 
“universal”, portable alarm sensor capable of operating on a movable robotic platform or in 
a life-supporting system? Such a sensor should demonstrate: 
1. Immediate response; 
2. Reliability: several processes are used to measure one parameter; 
3. Multi-functionality: one process is used to measure several parameters; 
4. Operability in hard environmental conditions; 
5. Cheap, effective, simple hardware; 
6. Sophisticated, “smart” software; 
7. Low power consumption; 
8. Self-calibration ability; 
9. Synergistic data processing; 
10. No additional external devices: pumps, calibrator, power supplies; 
11. Immune to thermal, radiation, and mechanical noise; 
12. Compatible with other sensors, sensory networks, and scientific instruments.   
5. Nuclear power plant operational conditions 
A nuclear power plant is a very specific object where the requirements for the Net4S are 
especially high. There are some technical problems in the sense of network exploitation. The 
optical elements (fibers, lasers, optics) can be colored under ionizing radiation. The main 
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components of electronics (semiconductor materials) are affected by such radiation as well. 
The penetrating radiation can affect the computer and electronics operation without even 
physically destroying these elements, resulting in the generation of false signals through the 
system. So, the optical sensors have some troubles, operating in this area.  
In space, nuclear power, and other scientific applications, optical glass may be exposed to 
high-energy radiation like gamma-, electron, proton, and neutron radiation. With the 
accumulation of higher doses, this radiation changes the transmittance of optical glass 
especially near the UV-visible edge of the spectrum. The investigations of resistance of 
glasses versus ionizing radiation were intensively provided in 50’s; these investigations 
were connected with research on nuclear bomb action on optical devices and other 
techniques.        
Generally speaking, a long history of space exploration and NPP exploitation has 
accumulated enough knowledge on safe operation of opto-electronic devices at regular 
reactor conditions. However, for emergency cases, the sensory network should be protected 
so as to survive in catastrophes similar to the one in Chernobyl. First of all, a circuit of well-
protected sensors should be installed on the perimeter of the NPP to supply the “outside” 
world with information in case the internal system is down. As this chapter is oriented for a 
wide range of readers, let us consider very shortly the problems in design and construction 
of internal opto-electronic sensors. 
Firstly, any glass components (fibers, objectives, prisms, filters, etc.) located in the reactor 
and surrounding zones can be affected by ionizing radiation. Ionization caused by photon 
and particle radiation, changes the transmittance of optical glasses (Friebele, 1974; Schott, 
2007; Sigel, 1974; Smith, 1964). An absorbed radiation dose of 10 Gy (10J energy of absorbed 
ionizing radiation by 1 kg of matter) gamma radiation leads to recognizable loss in 
transmittance over the complete visible spectral range. The decrease of transmittance is most 
significant at the UV-edge of the spectrum. Most glasses become unusable for optical 
applications if the radiation is increased to 100 Gy. The intensity of the color change does 
not only depend on the type of radiation dose but also on the energy of the ionizing 
radiation and the radiation dose rate.  
Optical glasses can be stabilized against transmittance loss caused by ionizing radiation by 
adding cerium to the composition. The extent of stabilization depends on the glass type. In 
general, the higher the cerium content, the more the glass is stabilized against higher total 
doses but the more the intrinsic transmittance is reduced. In addition, the impact to the color 
change by addition of cerium depends on the glass matrix. 
Most of the modern technological and telecom lasers work within the 1-2 microns 
wavelength range. So, the ionizing irradiation affects the transparency of glasses mostly in 
the wavelength range where the typical lasers do not work.  
It should be mentioned that most of the currently operating NPPs have been designed and 
built 20-40 years ago. During this time, a lot of new radiation-protected technologies have 
been developed. One techno-cluster that absorbs a lot of new, specially developed 
technologies is the Large Hadron Collider (which started to work in 2010). These 
technologies are extreme radiation-resisting plastics, micro-cables, and radiation detectors. 
These technologies were designed to survive the radiation levels that are equivalent to a 
100-megaton nuclear bomb explosion. Now is definitely the time to use them on old and 
new NPPs.     
Generally speaking, all semiconductor devices are very sensitive to ionizing radiation. 
The attempts to use robots on the Chernobyl NPP failed very fast. The fact that 
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semiconductor devices irradiated by nuclear bomb ionizing and radio pulses stop 
operating tens of kilometers around a bomb explosion is well known. However, old 
electronic bulb devices still survive despite being very close to the epicenter (if not 
destroyed mechanically). So, two variants are possible: 1) all robot controllers and other 
electronics units should be located in a protected cabin with a cable connected to the robot 
engines, or 2) the electronics should be designed with old-fashioned components that are 
very insensitive to ionizing radiation. 
6. Located on-robot 
A sensor system for a reconnaissance mobile robot must monitor many environmental 
parameters; however, in miniature systems, we cannot simply combine several different 
sensors because of weight, size, and power consumption limitations. Therefore, all available 
processes and information gathered from sensor-environment interactions should be used 
for monitoring these different parameters. 
The current tendency in the development of technologies for dangerous sites is the 
application of mobile robots. Such systems are under intensive development in Japan, USA, 
Canada, China, and the EU. Robots, as “environmental” guards, have some advantages and 
disadvantages. From one side, having limited “intellectual” abilities, a robot cannot find 
probabilistic solutions for unexpected problems. On the other hand, a robot has no human 
characteristics such as panic, fatigue, or narcotic/alcohol dependency that can suppress 
normal human abilities. The most useful and current application for a robot is as a carrier of 
sensors with preprocessing of the data. Regular reconnaissance robots may be applied 
without limitation within a NPP zone. However, to increase the emergency protection of the 
robots within the core (reactor) and secondary (building and territory) zones, the robots 
should be designed with high radiation and temperature protection. 
A mobile robot with multi-gas sensors and a multifunctional spectrometer on-board is 
capable of identifying more than a hundred gases, liquids, and solids, locally and remotely. 
Such a system can be additionally supplied with a non-linear microscope, cameras, 
rangefinders, a laser-ultrasound scanner, and other techniques for detailed scanning of the 
environment and atmospheric conditions. This system is under development at several 
industrial companies and Universities in Canada: 1) Engineering Services, Inc. (Toronto) 
(ESI, n.d.), University of Toronto (Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering) 
(RAL, n.d.), P&P Optica, Inc. (Waterloo) (P&P Optica, n.d.).        
The end-goal is to develop a smart sensory network for environmental monitoring, which is 
capable of performing tasks not possible by natural sensory-organs, in an effort to increase 
public and private security (Peshko, 2007; Matharoo, 2010). As the first step in achieving this 
goal, the design of an integral part of the proposed smart sensor-network: an all-in-one, 
multi-gas, photonic sensor (for CO, CO2, CH4, N2O, O2, and H2O vapor sensing) is provided. 
The sensory platform also houses independent total-pressure and temperature sensors, 
infrared, ultraviolet, and -ray radiation detectors.  
7. Catastrophe simulator: Computer forecasting of processes and events 
The problems of continuous reliability and adequateness are apparent in measurements, 
especially if we need to measure in some unexpected, unpredictable, and unfriendly 
conditions. Sometimes, occasional combinations of the sensor signals may be interpreted as 
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an alarm signal, and, sometimes, at really dangerous situations, the alarm system “is 
sleeping” because an unpredictable interference of the environmental parameters may mask 
the real event. Thus, modeling the environmental processes together with the reactor’s 
operational processes is necessary. This includes mapping the internal temperature and 
pressure parameters (dependent on the external ones), radioactive background during the 
reload process of technological elements and normal standard operation, and other 
repair/maintenance operations. A simulator will help check a number of situations that may 
or may not have happened in real life over thousands of years. Additionally, analyzing 
space-time event-maps and weather conditions will help to remotely identify the event and 
predict its dynamics. The end-goal is to develop a smart sensor-network for monitoring a 
nuclear power plant and its surrounding areas to estimate the most probable means that are 
necessary to predict and prevent catastrophic events. 
A full size simulator should include: 1) Modeling of meteorological conditions (in case of 
an emergency, the area located along the wind path should be alarmed first); 2) 
Temperature 3D map: the heating/cooling plant model (sun/wind action, reactor 
operation, air-conditioning operation) should be taken into account – is it an internal 
source of unexpected heating or are external current factors resulting in local internal 
heating; what are the amplitudes of possible construction stresses in case of catastrophes); 
3) Map of the over-ground and underground rivers, big water reservoirs; 4) Possible 
action of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other natural phenomena; 5) Modeling of the 
security system and problems with its operation in case of a catastrophe, cyber or direct 
terrorist attacks, errors, and emergencies. 
8. Reactor zone security monitoring 
The general reason for an alarm in any type of the security system is, “something is wrong”. 
This concept is not connected with any specific technology. It is based on pre-calibrated 
standard scenarios and logical chains of events that typically happen if “everything is right”. 
For example, let us consider the monitoring of personnel motion inside some protected 
zone: 
1. Someone inserts a card key into the (corridor) door (does not matter who as the key 
may be stolen); 
2. The cameras monitoring the door space confirm a moving object (it does not matter 
who (what) is imaged on monitors, as the security system may be hacked and some 
recording transferred to the monitors); 
3. The motion sensors confirm that something is moving along the corridor; 
4. The sound analyzers confirm that the sound spectrum of steps belongs to a person who 
did open a door (codes of the key), the person is alone, and moves along the way 
he/she is authorized to walk.  
Non-confirmation at any stage of the described chain results in the activation of an alarm. In 
this case, the most important thing is not the right signal at each stage that may be falsified 
or not mentioned by security personnel, but the right sequence of actions with some specific 
signs at each stage.  
If no motion is detected by the cameras (comparing pixel information variations, not by 
motion sensors!) for 20-30 seconds in the security room, it means that the security guards are 
neutralized or sleeping; an alarm should be activated automatically. This algorithm can be 
applied in any protected zone: banks, treasures, military sites, and so on.       
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It is very important that the same logic and the same sensors can be used for NPP safety 
control.           
9. After 9/11 
After the events of 9/11, governments are paying more attention to the protection of 
NPPs. USA’s Congressional Research Service published open documents that describe the 
main requirements for the newly designed plants and propose the means for protection of 
old operating units. These documents are focused on analyses of NPP vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks (Holt, 2007) and general problems of NPP security and vulnerability 
(Holt, 2010). I cite here some key paragraphs from these documents because of their high 
importance. 
“Nuclear plant security measures are designed to protect three primary areas of 
vulnerability: controls on the nuclear chain reaction, cooling systems that prevent hot 
nuclear fuel from melting even after the chain reaction has stopped, and storage facilities for 
highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. U.S. plants are designed and built to prevent dispersal 
of radioactivity, in the event of an accident, by surrounding the reactor in a steel-reinforced 
concrete containment structure. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved its final rule amending the design 
basis threat (DBT) (10 C.F.R. Part 73.1) on January 29, 2007, effective April 18, 2007. 
Although specific details of the revised DBT were not released to the public, in general the 
final rule  
 clarifies that physical protection systems are required to protect against diversion and 
theft of fissile material; 
 expands the assumed capabilities of adversaries to operate as one or more teams and 
attack from multiple entry points; 
 assumes that adversaries are willing to kill or be killed and are knowledgeable about 
specific target selection; 
 expands the scope of vehicles that licensees must defend against to include water 
vehicles and land vehicles beyond four-wheel-drive type; 
 revises the threat posed by an insider to be more flexible in scope; and 
 adds a new mode of attack from adversaries coordinating a vehicle bomb assault with 
another external assault. 
In October 2006, NRC proposed to amend the security regulations and add new security 
requirements that would codify the series of orders issued after 9/11 and respond to 
requirements in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The new security regulations were 
approved by the NRC Commissioners on December 17, 2008, and published March 27, 
2009: 
 Safety and Security Interface. Explicit requirements are established for nuclear plants to 
ensure that necessary security measures do not compromise plant safety. 
 Mixed-Oxide Fuel. Enhanced physical security requirements are established to prevent 
theft or diversion of plutonium-bearing mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. 
 Cyber Security. Nuclear plants must submit security plans that describe how digital 
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 Aircraft Attack Mitigative Strategies and Response. As discussed in the earlier section 
on vulnerability to aircraft crashes, nuclear plants must prepare strategies for 
responding to warnings of an aircraft attack and for mitigating the effects of large 
explosions and fires. 
 Plant Access Authorization. Nuclear plants must implement more rigorous programs 
for authorizing access, including enhanced psychological assessments and behavioral 
observation. 
 Security Personnel Training and Qualification. Modifications to security personnel 
requirements include additional physical fitness standards, increased minimum 
qualification scores for mandatory personnel tests, and requirements for on-the-job 
training. 
 Physical Security Enhancements. New requirements are intended to ensure the 
availability of backup security command centers, uninterruptible power supplies to 
detection systems, enhanced video capability, and protection from waterborne 
vehicles.” 
From my point of view, these documents do not pay enough attention to the tendencies of 
modern weapons. It is much harder to protect a NPP from small, truck-launched weapons 
than from a big rocket sent from a plane or ship hundreds of kilometers away from the 
NNP. 
It is interesting to note that the problems that took place at Fucushima’s reactors (after 
earthquake) were listed in the NRC documents listed above. So, these documents and the 
NPP live their own independent life: corporate interests stand higher than the security of the 
entire country.   
Technological monitoring of a power plant includes the control of radiation level (all types 
of ionizing radiation), temperature, humidity, and some ions and gases that may appear as a 
result of normal technological process or abnormal situations, for example, CO2 or CO, 
CxHy, and NOx in case of a fire. However, the gas monitoring system should also monitor 
explosive vapours, nerve/blister agents, and other substances that can be used in terrorist 
actions or during preparing for such actions.  
10. Some simple ideas 
The key issue is electrical consumption – feeding the security network and coolers for  
the reactors and burned fuel. The special attention zone is reserve electrical generators 
and pumps for cooling systems. The recent catastrophe (March 2011) in Japan definitely 
demonstrated that a reserve generator should be mounted on the damping pyramid  
with height two times higher than any tsunami or other floating debris potentially 
affecting the generator. It would be nice to introduce a technique where if the reserve 
generator is not checked once a year, the NPP should automatically slow down to a safe 
power minimum, and no NPP personnel, government official, or president of the NPP 
operating company can turn off the “shut down” option. The best way is to install a 
generator out of the NPP territory with several power lines going to the NPP by different 
ways. The cooling loops should be duplicated and triplicated (as much as engineers 
would decide). It is strongly recommended to have a lot of small pumps instead of fewer 
high power pumps. 
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The best option is to build a reservoir of alarm cooling liquid capable of autonomously 
operating the coolers until the NPP slows down to a safe level. 
Every day, on my way to work, I see big tanks of water along the road in each municipality. 
A relatively low-power pump delivers water to the tank 25-m high and after that, the water 
runs to consumers without any pumping. So why this extremely simple technology, which 
was actually developed during the times of ancient Rome, is not used as an emergency 
reserve cooler that can work until the risk crew reconstructs a source of electricity to support 
the main pumps’ operation?                               
Analysis of the recent cyber attacks around the world shows that from time to time, higher 
and higher protected entities, like banks, governments, and big corporations that put in 
extra efforts to protect their sites and databases, are successfully hacked. It is time to 
develop special interfaces that have no electrical (wire/wireless) contact between the inside-
outside zones of the protected segments of the network. 
11. Conclusions  
This chapter discusses the principles of development of a Smart Synergistic Security Sensory 
Network for Harsh Environments: Net4S. It includes an analysis of: 
 the technical aspects of operability of the sensors, optical, and electrical 
telecommunication channels, and computers in the presence of ionizing radiation;  
 the influence of environmental parameters on the sensors’ accuracy and network 
operability;  
 the development of simulators capable of advising safe solutions based on the analysis 
of the data acquired by the Net4S; and  
 social aspects of the Nuclear Power Plant design, construction, and exploitation.  
In total, such a real-time operating network should monitor: 
 environmental and atmospheric conditions: chemical, biological, radiological, 
explosive, and weather hazards;  
 climate/man-induced catastrophes;  
 contamination of water, soil, food chains, and public health care delivery; and  
 large public/industrial/government/military areas.  
The end terminals of the system consist of mobile robotic and stationary platforms, 
equipped with a set of portable environmental sensors that are connected to the monitoring 
centers. Each sensor should be a self-registering, self-reporting, plug-and-play unit that uses 
unified electrical and/or optical connectors and operates with the IP communication 
protocol.  
To control the situation inside and outside a NPP, the Sensory Network should monitor 
several zones:  
 core (reactor) area;  
 plant building and surrounding territory;  
 10-30 km radius zone; and  
 entire country and neighboring territories. 
A concept of an “inhomogeneous network” is also introduced. This network combines a set 
of different types of sensors to measure different parameters (sub-networks), and different 
types of sensors that measure the same parameter but based on different physical 
phenomena. The Net4S aims to solve several problems simultaneously: 
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 the detection and estimation of critical events by a synergistic sensory-network,  
 higher reliability of multi-substance sensors based on different operational principles; 
and  
 prediction of critical events based on a history of monitored parameters. 
The reactor area should be monitored by a network of local sensors and by the network of 
remote sensors, in case the core zone is in a state of emergency.   
Among different types of sensors, only optical laser sensors can respond immediately and 
remotely. Such sensors can simultaneously monitor several gases, vapours, and ions with 
the help of one laser; however, the use of several lasers operating at different wavelengths, 
dramatically improves accuracy and reliability, and increases the number of monitored 
substances. A synergistic sensory network can monitor the background optical losses 
(scattering), environmental pressure, temperature, and humidity. 
The Net4S, monitoring a number of parameters inside and outside a Nuclear Power Plant, 
can serve as the security, safety, and controlling system of the NPP. 
The most critical parts of the cooling systems should be self-operable: the water should be 
delivered from the highly located tank by free running without any pumps.  
In total, the security system should identify natural events (hurricane, earthquake, 
abnormally high or low temperatures and pressures), unauthorized access to the NPP 
(terrorist attack, hacker’s attack) and wrong personnel actions.  
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